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This article presents the results of a comparative study of genocide prevention showing similarities
that form a disappointing pattern of failure on the part of third parties to prevent genocide in three
different situations: Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Darfur. Early, clear, and reliable warnings combined
with a policy recommendation have not led to preventative action because they were not discussed
by the responsible decision makers (Rwanda, Srebrenica) and/or because conflicting international
concerns hindered firm action (Darfur). Instruments of prevention were available, in the form of UN
peacekeeping troops who could have been empowered for successful prevention in combination
with existing reinforcements (e.g., evacuation troops or NATO air support); however, this option
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parties is their inability to perceive a change from a peace-settlement situation to an emerging
genocide and their consequent inability to react to such a change adequately. Rwanda and Srebrenica
may be explained in this way, but not Darfur. Here the situation is different and more complicated, as
this study shows by reference to the continuing international attention to the situation, on the one
hand, and the continuing inability of third parties to change the situation on the ground, on the
other. Sudan’s political position in the world, as well as the negotiating power the Sudanese
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of third parties to prevent genocide in three different situations: Rwanda,
Srebrenica, and Darfur. Early, clear, and reliable warnings combined with a
policy recommendation have not led to preventative action because they were not
discussed by the responsible decision makers (Rwanda, Srebrenica) and/or
because conflicting international concerns hindered firm action (Darfur).
Instruments of prevention were available, in the form of UN peacekeeping troops
who could have been empowered for successful prevention in combination with
existing reinforcements (e.g., evacuation troops or NATO air support); however, this
option was not on the decision makers’ agenda. The main explanation for the
decisions made by these third parties is their inability to perceive a change from a
peace-settlement situation to an emerging genocide and their consequent inability
to react to such a change adequately. Rwanda and Srebrenica may be explained
in this way, but not Darfur. Here the situation is different and more complicated,
as this study shows by reference to the continuing international attention to the
situation, on the one hand, and the continuing inability of third parties to change
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circumstances, has deterred decision makers from initiating measures against
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Introduction
In just 100 days, starting in the spring of 1994, an estimated 800,000 persons were
killed in the Rwandan Genocide.1 The early warnings issued before the killings started
were clear, and they were put forward to the responsible decision makers at the United
Nations. The information came from the most authoritative and reliable sources
available: the UN peacekeeper commanders in the field. This information was
completely reliable, and the commanders sent their early warnings in combination
with a request for instructions and proposals on how to act in the circumstances.
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For instance, the request from peacekeepers in Rwanda to track arms caches—the
so-called genocide fax—was sent on 11 January 1994, three months before the genocide
began. The alarming information in the fax was not disputed by the UN secretariat,
but the peacekeepers were refused authorization for action because the seizure of
weapons was seen as going beyond their mandate. As we will describe below, hardly
any decision making to prevent—or, later, to stop—the genocide took place in the
Security Council. Tragically, the failures of Rwanda are being repeated today. The task
of tracking arms caches, which was included in the mandate for the peacekeepers in
Darfur, was deleted in Security Council Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007. The main
question addressed in this article is, What are the lessons to be drawn from the
genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Darfur? Our discussion of Rwanda is based on
the study The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders,
published in 2007;2 the discussion of Srebrenica is based on a study published in 2008,
‘‘The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda and Srebrenica: Lessons Learned.’’3 The discussion
of Darfur is based on ongoing research into early warning and early action between
2003 and 2008.
Rwanda
Long before the plane crash that triggered the ensuing events, the situation in Rwanda
could have been described as a ‘‘possible genocide.’’4 In the first week of the atrocities—
after the plane crash—the killings were mostly of political adversaries (i.e., moderate
political leaders), and can therefore be described as a politicide. In the second week,
however, the killing of all persons from the Tutsi ethnic group began, with more than
100,000 killings committed in a week’s time. A month into the genocide, about half
a million people had been killed. After the second month, invading forces
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front under Paul Kagame captured the last strongholds of
the prior government, and the genocide came to an end.5
Srebrenica
In one week in mid-July 1995, 8,000 Muslim men and boys were killed in and near
Srebrenica, the UN-protected ‘‘safe haven’’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As in Rwanda, UN
peacekeepers failed to provide protection after the Bosnian Serbs conquered the area,
which had earlier been designated as a safe area by the United Nations. We describe
below a number of warnings in the months preceding the atrocities that made the
genocidal intentions of the Bosnian Serbs clear. The International Court of Justice
established these intentions more than ten years later when it condemned another
third party, Serbia-Montenegro, for violating the obligation to prevent genocide in
Srebrenica. In its judgment of 26 February 2007, the court held that ‘‘a state does not
incur responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility is
however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent
genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing
the genocide.’’6 More information on the Bosnian Serb policy is expected to emerge
from the trial of Radovan Karadzic´, arrested in 2008, before the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia.
Darfur
In a period of five years—between 2003 and 2008—an estimated 300,000 Sudanese
people of African origin, mostly male, have been killed in the Darfur region of Sudan.
The killings began in February 2003; by the end of that year 10,000 had been killed,
Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:2 August 2009
222
and the number of killings increased to 100,000 in 2004 and to 200,000 again from
100,000. Since 2005, the numbers have increased to about 300,000.7 The perpetrators
are members of the Sudanese army and armed groups supported by the authorities,
such as the Janjaweed militia. Some scholars8 and policy makers9 have labeled this a
genocide, while others categorize the same atrocities as crimes against humanity.10
No international jurisprudence has been issued in this case to date, and this article
does not intend to contribute to the debate on whether or not genocide has occurred.
The first military revolt by the African Darfuri people—mainly the non-Arab Fur,
Zaghawa, and Massaleit—in February 2003 was met directly with reprisals that had
the characteristics of a beginning genocide. Events and developments in Darfur since
2003 have been reported from the start by many NGOs, states, and international
organizations. No clear signals with respect to the intentions of these ethnic killings
and the emergence of warfare from before 2003 are available. Because the magnitude
of the killings was much more limited, and the events spread over a longer period, than
in Rwanda, Darfur has been referred to as ‘‘Rwanda in slow motion.’’11 The slow
unfolding of events, the availability of information at an early stage, and remorse
for the failures to act in Rwanda and Srebrenica made Darfur an outstanding
case for political mobilization in the Western world to urge governments to act and stop
the ongoing atrocities. The result, however, has been no better than in the other two
cases.
This state of affairs raises a number of compelling questions: Why did
international bystanders fail to act to prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda,
Srebrenica, and Darfur? What are the similarities and differences among these cases?
In what way would the international bystander have been able to act with the
available instruments? Why were the warnings not translated into action, or, more
precisely, what are the reasons for inaction or the ineffectiveness of the action that
was undertaken? Who was involved in the international decision-making process, and
why was that process continually hampered?
Before answering these questions, we will briefly describe, for each of the three
cases, (1) the availability of information that could have been seen as early warning
signs requiring action; (2) the availability of military and non-military instruments to
prevent or stop these atrocities, here called genocide; and (3) the decision-making
process that took place by governments and within the United Nations.
Rwanda
Warning
The warnings of the emerging genocide were already sounded a year before the killings
began by many NGOs,12 by the UN special rapporteur on extra-judicial executions,13
and by diplomats.14 Actors in the international decision-making arena, however,
viewed the situation in Rwanda as a resolved conflict, with a peace process beginning
whereby a mutually agreed peace plan (the Arusha Accords) needed to be
implemented—a job that could be done with a small, lightly armed peacekeeping
force. This vision did not change when the UN peacekeepers stationed in Rwanda
(the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, or UNAMIR) sent alarming reports to
New York asking for a stronger mandate to seize weapons and for a bolstering of their
forces to act against the extremists,15 including the ‘‘genocide fax’’ that unveiled the
intention to kill Belgian peacekeepers and the Tutsi population. In the months
preceding the genocide, all these warnings were received but did not change the
decisions of the UN Secretariat, which continued to think in terms of peace and
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security and of the post-conflict transformation process of installing a new multi-ethnic
government.16 In their bureaucratic vision, the UN had to maintain a traditional
neutral peacekeeping role and not take sides against the perpetrators of the impending
genocide through forceful action, as was requested by, for example, UNAMIR
commander Lt.-Gen. Rome´o Dallaire and the Belgian government. So the most
reliable warnings, coupled with a policy recommendation on how to act, were
forwarded and received in New York; but this information, including reports on the
deteriorating situation, was not forwarded to the members of the Security Council,
who were thus precluded from taking any action at all.
Instruments
The available instruments were rather weak, because, for reasons of political
feasibility, the manpower and the mandate requested by the UN Secretariat from
the Security Council were less than the situation required. No further options were put
forward to the Security Council, despite requests from UN military experts and both
parties to the Arusha Accords for a stronger mandate and more troops to implement
the accords. Even with the available instruments, the peacekeepers were prohibited
from taking action against the inciters of hatred and the planners of the genocide
within the ranks of the extremists. After the genocide began and ten Belgian
peacekeepers were deliberately killed, most of the remaining peacekeepers were
ordered to leave the country when the Security Council approved their withdrawal in
Resolution 912 (see Figure 1).
Perhaps the available instruments were too weak to enable action during the
genocide or to stop the genocide. In order to evaluate this question properly, however,
we must take two important considerations into account. First, the peacekeepers had
been instructed in the six preceding months to act in a preventive way; they received
no permission for forceful action from UN headquarters when the situation changed
from ‘‘peace promotion’’ (i.e., facilitating the implementation of the peace accords) to
the threat of an emerging genocide. The UN’s main threat to the extremist rulers in
Rwanda was that the peacekeepers would be withdrawn if stability were not achieved;
in fact, however, this was the outcome the ge´nocidaires were longing for. Second, at the
beginning of the genocide a huge fighting force arrived in Rwanda to evacuate foreign
nationals.17 The possibility of combining this strong military force with the weaker UN
peacekeeping force was never tabled in any Western capital or at UN headquarters—a
clear signal to the ge´nocidaires that no one from outside Rwanda would obstruct the
unfolding genocide.
Decision Making
The members of the Security Council were not informed by the UN Secretariat about
the alarming situation in Rwanda because the highest-ranking civil servants at the
UN, who had no political legitimacy, feared a collapse of their peacekeeping
department after the failures in Somalia.18 During the genocide the Security
Council decided, in Resolution 912, to withdraw the UNAMIR forces. A decision
to start again with another peacekeeping force (Resolution 918) could not be
implemented during the genocide; only after the RPF victory did France initiate an
enforcement force based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Security Council Resolution
929) to protect the Hutu refugees in the neighboring country (see Figure 1). No attempt
to prevent or to stop the genocide was made by the bystanders, who in this
case, perhaps more clearly than in any other case of genocide, became collaborators
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of the perpetrators. All elements of genocide were very obvious; all were observed; but
these observations were not acted upon. The ‘‘never again’’ spoken by so many after the
Holocaust now rings alarmingly hollow: in 1994, 800,000 persons were killed within
100 days, with the most primitive instruments, while the most powerful states and
international organizations, which had access to the most sophisticated instruments,
knowingly allowed this to happen.
Srebrenica
Warning
Since January 1994, a detachment of peacekeepers from the Netherlands (Dutchbat)
from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping mission, had been charged
with protecting the so-called safe area of Srebrenica. The official Dutch report on the
events in Srebrenica19 argues that the enclave was taken by surprise and that because
of the fall of the enclave, the genocide that took place could not have been prevented.
According to this version of the events, no third party can be blamed for having failed
to undertake preventive action. The situation is less comfortable than the report’s
authors suggest, however, for several reasons:
(1) At least two months before the attack occurred, members of the UN Security
Council and the UN Secretariat were informed about the impending attack.20
They did not share this information with the Dutch government or military
officials.21 The possibility of preventive military enforcement was excluded by
the UN and the major powers. No debate was held in the Security Council on
maintaining the safe area in Srebrenica.
(2) The genocidal intent of Bosnian Serbs toward Bosnian Muslims was known to
third parties.22 With this knowledge, the subsequent failure to act to prevent
the genocide makes the third party a collaborator with the perpetrators; that
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is why the state of Serbia-Montenegro, for instance, was condemned by the
ICJ, as noted earlier. The legal duty to act to try to prevent genocide has now
been established.
(3) More than a year before the attack on Srebrenica, Tuzla, another safe area
in Bosnia, was attacked by the Bosnian Serbs. The Danish and other
Scandinavian troops stationed there successfully defended the enclave with
force, protecting the Bosnian Muslims in Tuzla. In the fifteen-month period
between these two acts of aggression, no lessons were drawn with respect to
the defense of Srebrenica.23
Although the period between the fall of Srebrenica and the beginning of the
genocide was very short (see Figure 2), these three factors can be considered clear
warnings on which action in the Srebrenica area could have been based.
Instruments
The Scandinavian peacekeeping troops in Tuzla (NORDBATT) had at their disposal
powerful military weapons, including tanks, the availability of which they negotiated
before agreeing to participate in UN peacekeeping in the area. The Dutch did not
have such instruments at their disposal, and the troops of the ‘‘air mobile brigade’’ they
sent had relatively little combat experience. From a legal standpoint, their ability to
use force was no different from that of the Nordic troops: both were under the mandate
of the larger UNPROFOR mission, which was based on UN Security Council
Resolutions 819 and 824, and both were governed by the same rules of engagement,
in which conditions for the use of force were precisely spelled out. These rules granted
some discretion to the force commander to act according to his assessment of the
situation, and this made a tremendous difference, as was evident after the killing
of the 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica.
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The Dutch did not consider the strength needed, both in manpower and in
weaponry, before accepting the peacekeeping mission. The decision on weaponry was
taken at the national level: light armaments were chosen (a) because limited time was
available for training, (b) in accordance with the current UN peacekeeping principles,
and (c) to demonstrate that the weapons could be used for only self-defense, and thus
avoid provoking the Serbs. However, both the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, and the UNPROFOR commander, Lt.-Gen. Francis Briquemont, favored more
heavy weaponry and had communicated this to the Dutch government. The Canadian
peacekeepers who preceded the Dutch unit in Srebrenica informed them of the harsh
conditions and the impossibility of disarming the Muslim troops in this so-called safe
area. In hindsight, the difference between a weak peacekeeping force, on the one hand,
and a stronger defense force to protect the safe haven and the population, on the other
hand, is evident; the light weaponry of the Dutch unit was suited to the first objective,
but not to the second.24 The strength of Dutchbat was inadequate to defend the enclave
when it was confronted with such explicit aggression. Nonetheless, three factors must
be considered to put this evaluation in context.
First, the Dutch troops did not attempt to defend the enclave, nor did they try to
hinder the deportation of the Muslim men. They were criticized for this attitude in the
UN secretary-general’s inquiry report, prepared by David Harland.25 Second, they put
themselves in a very vulnerable position from the beginning of their mission and did
not urge any strengthening of troops and equipment during the three years of their
stay in Bosnia, even as the situation deteriorated enormously26—for instance, in
response to the continual obstruction of Dutchbat transportation between the enclaves
of Zepa and Srebrenica.27 Third, they put almost all their trust in NATO air forces
based at Villafranca, in Italy, to protect them on the ground and to deter aggressors.
This strategy failed particularly when peacekeepers were held hostage—the tactic of
taking UN troops hostage to deter air attacks had already been used frequently by
Bosnian Serb forces. On 11 July, air support had finally been activated, but several
peacekeepers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, who broadcasted an
ultimatum: the peacekeepers would be killed if the air attacks did not stop. This
ultimatum was quickly put through to the Dutch minister of defense, Joris Voorhoeve,
who then telephoned UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi; the UN secretary-
general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali; Willy Claes, secretary-general of NATO; the NATO
Airbase at Vicenza, from which the fighter jets had been deployed; and military
commanders in Bosnia, urging that air support be stopped immediately and planned
actions be cancelled. The primordial reason was the Serbian threat of shelling and of
harming the Dutch peacekeepers; above all, Voorhoeve feared for their safety. Other
reasons were also communicated, however, including the closeness of Dutch peace-
keepers to the Serbs and the refugees in between, which would make an air attack
dangerous. Finally, Voorhoeve added that an air attack was no longer useful, since the
enclave had already fallen.28 The air attack was stopped. It later became clear that the
decision to stop the attack was made in Sarajevo by Akashi (at 4:30 p.m. on 11 July)
before Voorhoeve’s telephone call to him (which was made at 4:50 p.m.).29 Although
Akashi made the decision to cancel the peacekeepers’ air support without influence
from the Dutch government, he repeatedly stated that ‘‘the SRSG [Akashi] felt that he
had no other choice but to comply with this request.’’30 The argument that the Serbian
and Dutch military were too close to each other for NATO to begin an air attack was
also made by Gen. Bernard Janvier, the UN military commander in Zagreb, and by
Gen. Frank van Kappen, military advisor to the UN secretary-general in New York.
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The argument that the safe area had already been conquered by the Serbs was put
forward by NATOmilitary commanders as well. The threat of killing peacekeepers was
very effective. In Rwanda, as we have seen, most peacekeeping forces were withdrawn
after the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers. In Srebrenica, military action was
aborted following a threat to kill Dutch peacekeepers. The result, in both situations,
was that the targeted populations became very vulnerable and were no longer
protected; the ge´nocidaires were not hindered by any third party.
Decision Making
The Dutch government had almost no involvement in the decision making (or lack of
decision making) in the Security Council. This is remarkable, given that Dutch
peacekeepers were on the ground in Srebrenica to protect the safe area. Only after the
fall of Srebrenica was Voorhoeve, the Dutch minister of defense, informed by his
intelligence service that two or three of his NATO allies and permanent members of
the Security Council (the United Kingdom, the United States, and France) had spoken
in May about a possible attack on Srebrenica, and that they decided not to take
any action to prevent such an attack31 nor did they inform the government of the
Netherlands at that time.32 By the time the attack took place, the Security Council had
been incorrectly informed at least twice.33 The false information provided gave the
impression that what was taking place was not outright aggression but minor fighting
in the field, to which no forceful response was required. This misinformation was
distributed to the members of the Security Council by the UN Secretariat. Four days
after the attack, Security Council members were again briefed with false information.
Just after the attacks began, urgent requests for air support received by the UN were
not sent to the Security Council; moreover, ‘‘the day before Srebrenica fell we [the UN
Secretariat] reported that the Serbs were not attacking when they were. We reported
that the Bosniacs had fired on an UNPROPOR blocking position when it was the
Serbs..’’34
The inadequate information passed on to the members of the Security Council was
thus of pivotal importance in both cases: the situation in Rwanda was perceived as a
civil war, and the attack on Srebrenica was not perceived as outright aggression.
Irrespective of other factors or of the reasons for these misperceptions, the genocides
that followed in both cases were not seen as presenting an imminent danger by the
decision makers in New York. After the fall of Srebrenica and during the days of the
subsequent genocide, all bystanders became collaborators with the perpetrators,
resulting in the first genocide in Europe since the Holocaust.
Darfur
Warning
While the onset of the conflict in Darfur is disputed, it is assumed here that the
emergence of the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) in claiming responsibility for an
attack on a military garrison in Golo, in the Jebel Marrah district in February 2003,
marks the de facto beginning of the rebellion. Soon thereafter, the Sudanese
government retaliated with aerial bombardments of towns in Darfur.35 Although
some authors rightfully refer to the root causes of the conflict as relating to historical
ethnic, economic, and geographical factors,36 this attack was on a new scale that had
not been publicly predicted before.
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The direct cause of this conflict stems from the inferior position of the people
of Darfur, who expected to get a better position, comparable with the greater autonomy
accorded to South Sudan.37 This is one of the reasons that the Darfur conflict
has always been linked in many ways to the North–South conflict in Sudan. The main
lines of reasoning to prioritize the North–South over the Darfur conflict were the
following:
(1) Only after the North–South conflict is resolved can the issue of Darfur be
resolved.38
(2) North–South solutions are delayed to postpone involvement in Darfur.39
(3) North–South agreement must never be endangered by Darfur.40
(4) North–South as priority should be stabilized with military peacekeeping only
to that area and not to Darfur. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was
restricted to the North–South conflict and could not be deployed in the Darfur
region as well.41
Ge´rard Prunier concluded from all these arguments that cooperating in the North–
South negotiations allow the Sudanese government to commit genocide in Darfur
without risk of foreign interference.42
The reservations listed above on action against the rising conflict in Darfur
should be taken into account. Information about what was going on in Darfur was
available and made public in 2003 by NGOs (Amnesty International was the first,
followed by the International Crisis Group43), states (e.g., The Netherlands44), and
international organizations (e.g., Jan Egeland and Mukesh Kapila of the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA45). In 2004 the United States
and the European Parliament followed with very strong statements.46 At that time
the conflict was still rather limited. Thus, in 2003 warnings had been sounded, but
the Security Council did not discuss the issue.47 It is remarkable that between the
beginning of 2003 and September 2004 no decision was made by the Security Council
to prevent an escalation of the gross human-rights violations beyond the 10,000
killings that had already taken place in a year’s time. In later stages—since
September 2004—the scale of killings increased significantly, as acknowledged by
policy makers at the time.48 At this point it was no longer possible to speak about
preventive actions; instead, the debate that took place centered on limiting or
resolving the conflict and was, therefore, not about the magnitude, scope,
seriousness, or frequency of the conflict and the gross human-rights violations
it involved but, rather, about the choice to be made as to what action could be taken.
It was in July 2004 that the UN Security Council adopted a very weak resolution to
disarm the Janjaweed—but without any sanctions against the Sudanese government
if it should fail to do so.49 By 9 September 2004, the American government, through
secretary of state Colin Powell, had labeled the situation in Darfur a genocide, based
on a field-mission report that made clear that the deliberate killings were focused on
one ethnic group, sparing civilians from another ethnic group in the nearby village.50
Figure 3 makes strikingly evident that after the adoption of this weak resolution in
July 2004, atrocities began to take place on a much larger scale. The increase in the
number of killings was very large—yet no one responded with forceful actions,
although the deterioration of the situation in the second half of 2004 was reported
and discussed at the United Nations. We will now examine the instruments used by
the UN in the period between 2003 and 2008.
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Instruments
The first UN official to raise the question of Darfur was the UN humanitarian
coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, in November 2003.51 Kapila labeled the
situation the most alarming humanitarian emergency in the world. The UN
coordinator of OCHA, Jan Egeland, was also very concerned about the large-scale
ethnic cleansing, and he urged immediate action.52 The secretary-general took the
opportunity of the memorial ceremonies for the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
Genocide, in April 2004, to address the situation in Darfur.53 Ceasefires failed to hold,
and the situation worsened; concern was expressed in a presidential statement by the
Security Council on 26 May. The first more concrete action was the recognition of
the crisis by the Security Council in June 2004, when Resolution 1547, addressing the
North–South Sudan peace process, mentioned ‘‘bring[ing] an immediate halt to the
fighting in Darfur.’’54 At the end of July, in Resolution 1556, the Security Council
imposed an arms embargo on the militias in Sudan and threatened the government of
Sudan with sanctions if it had not disarmed the Janjaweed within thirty days. This
resolution had some impact: within a week, a twelve-point Darfur Action Plan was
agreed on between the Sudanese government and the UN special representative for
Sudan, Jan Pronk.55 The threat of sanctions was then removed; Jan Pronk reported to
the Security Council two months later that the situation had again worsened and
large-scale militia violence had resumed.56 The Security Council reacted with two
more severe resolutions. First, in September 2004, when the United States had already
determined that the Sudanese were committing genocide and the European
Parliament had labeled the situation ‘‘tantamount to genocide,’’57 a resolution was
adopted to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate whether or not the term
genocide was applicable in this case.58 The Security Council’s concern about the
situation in Sudan, and particularly the North-South peace process, was great, and,
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at the initiative of the United States, the next meeting on Darfur took place in Nairobi.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 2004 addressed the North–South
Sudanese conflict but did not address Darfur. The overwhelming opinion was that once
the large-scale, long-lasting North–South conflict was resolved, a resolution for Darfur
would automatically follow, particularly because leaders of the South were now
involved in the government.59
Because all the focus was on success in the North–South peace process, the threat
of sanctions on Darfur was not repeated in November 2004. The hope for a positive
development was not realized, however: on the contrary, because the Sudanese
government now had more freedom to act in Darfur and no longer feared international
pressure, warfare in Darfur increased, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killings,
from 100,000 in November 2005 to 200.000 in August 2006 (see Figure 3). The
Sudanese government successfully played on the fears of other states that an
intervention in Darfur would jeopardize the peaceful end of the North–South Sudanese
civil war—Africa’s longest war—which had resulted in 2 million deaths. The UN was
increasingly reluctant to undertake any active involvement with respect to Darfur,
leaving that role to the African Union. The AU had already pledged a peacekeeping
mission of more than 3,300 personnel, but in October 2004 possessed only 597 soldiers
(deployed as a protection force for observers),60 while experts assessed that a relatively
small number of well-equipped troops—approximately 5,000, which could have been
made available quickly in July 2004, according a British chief of general staff61—could
have protected the camps in Darfur, provided humanitarian assistance, and set up
a no-fly zone (as had been proposed by the US Senate and European Parliament
in the spring of 200462). The Sudanese government succeeded over the following
years in obstructing any interference, with the support of both China and Russia in the
Security Council, which, over the long term, has resulted in a declining willingness to
act. This is a remarkable outcome, because the domestic pressure on Western
democracies to act in Darfur was very strong—particularly across the United States.
Over the past three years, a stalemate has been more or less maintained. On 31
March 2005, after the publication of the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry, the
Security Council adopted a resolution ‘‘to bring all those responsible to justice,’’ and the
case of Darfur was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order to
prosecute the perpetrators of the atrocities; on 29 March 2005a resolution was adopted
to establish a commission to prepare on targeted sanctions on specific persons and
travel bans on the members of the government of Sudan.63 This is not a firm position,
however, because no instruments have been applied. Figure 3 shows that from
mid-2005 on, the killings failed to slow from the increased pace reached by October
2004.
In 2006 the pressure was high to achieve some result, which led, for instance, to a
Security Council ministerial meeting in May and a visit by all Security Council
members in June to investigate the situation in Sudan/Darfur and Chad. The results,
however, were meager. The proposed expansion of the UNMIS peacekeeping force
in South Sudan to Darfur was adopted in August 2006 but never implemented.64
Since then two decisions have been taken with respect to the peacekeeping force.
On 25 September 2007, a peacekeeping mission (MINURCAT–EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)
was established in Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees
from Darfur. By this time a combined peacekeeping force about 31,000 UN and AU
troops (UNAMID) had been proposed and adopted on 31 July 2007.65 However,
the implementation of this resolution was made conditional on Sudan’s consent to the
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equipment of the troops and the selection of the troop-contributing countries, which
Sudan has given only on a case-by-case basis.66 Moreover, in the mean time the UN
has weakened this instrument relative to the August 2006 mandate (Resolution 1706):
the peacekeepers now lacks both the authorization to disarm the militias and a
mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians. It is very sad to observe that
the assignment in the mandate of 2006—‘‘to seize or collect arms or related material’’—
was not repeated in the mandate of 2007. The UN Secretariat’s prohibition on searches
for weapons in Rwanda in 1994 has been seen as critical to the failure to prevent that
genocide. Politics do not seem to have changed, and policy makers on Darfur have not
learned from the lessons of Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Decision Making
In contrast to the cases of Rwanda and Srebrenica, as we have seen, the Security
Council has been fully aware of the situation in Darfur. The Security Council has been
informed every month by many parties, including UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights in Geneva, on the current situation in Darfur. Public opinion has
been outspoken, with much pressure on Western governments from their domestic
constituencies to change the situation in Darfur and to act. Nonetheless, the Sudanese
government has been able to resist this pressure, through a series of small
accommodations and minor diplomatic moves, without ever really changing the
situation on the ground. Sudan is one of the more powerful states in the world, and can
afford not to give in, because of support from African and Arab states and from two
permanent members of the Security Council (China and Russia). The greatest pressure
was brought to bear in 2005 and 2006, but this pressure has also waned; the Security
Council has brought only two indictments to the ICC, neither of which the Sudanese
government is taking seriously. In 2008, the Security Council again urged Sudan
to ‘‘cooperate fully with the Court’’ on the two indictments.67 In fact, one of those
charged—former interior minister Ahmed Haroun—was appointed minister
of humanitarian affairs and advisor on human rights after his indictment. In July
2008, the ICC prosecutor also sought the indictment of Sudanese president Omar
al-Bashir; an arrest warrant was issued by the ICC on 4 March 2009.
The United Nations has also failed to declare a no-fly zone, and UNAMID forces
are still not fully deployed in the Darfur region to protect the internally displaced
persons in the camps; so the atrocities are continuing. The UN has again failed an
important test of the responsibility to protect.
Conclusions
This comparative genocide study has led us to the following conclusions on early
warnings, available instruments, decision-making processes, and outcomes.
The early warnings on Rwanda were very clear, reliable, outspoken, and linked
with a policy recommendation to the responsible decision makers. With respect to
Srebrenica, the warnings were not clear and outspoken at the moment of decision;
reconstruction of warnings is possible only in hindsight. The information available to
some permanent members of the Security Council and to the UN Secretariat was not
made public and did not lead to any preventive strategy. The warnings on Darfur were
clear and reliable, and were made public at an early stage; in addition, the atrocities in
Darfur were spread over a relatively long period, which made the development and
implementation of a preventive policy possible. The data on Darfur, unlike the data on
Rwanda and Srebrenica, were available to and discussed in the Security Council.
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The instruments to prevent genocide in Rwanda and in Srebrenica were available.
UN peacekeeping forces were deployed and could have been strengthened. In Rwanda,
moreover, the peacekeepers could have been empowered to stop the genocide
by combining their troops with the evacuation forces. In Srebrenica, lessons could
have been drawn from the successful and effective defense of another safe haven by
Scandinavian peacekeepers. In Darfur, the instruments were not available because of
lack of consent from the Sudanese government and the Security Council’s inability to
enforce troop deployment: at least two permanent members of the Security Council
rejected proposals for mandatory decisions. Moreover, the Sudanese North–South
peace process was prioritized over the Darfur conflict, which has led to a postponement
of action in Darfur in order not to jeopardize the North–South accord.
Decision making in the Security Council was hampered in the case of Rwanda
by the actions of those civil servants at the UN Secretariat who had primary
responsibility for supplying and withholding information on the conflict, and
who perceived the situation as a peacemaking processing involving the installation
of a transitional government and not as an emerging genocide. The UN Secretariat—
and, in particular, the DPKO—therefore favored a neutral rather than a confronta-
tional position. A shift in perception from facilitating the implementation of a
peace accord toward preventing an emerging genocide was needed, but no such shift
took place.
In the case of Srebrenica, only after the fall of the ‘‘safe area’’ did the Security
Council begin enforcement measures against the Bosnian Serbs, which ultimately
resulted in the Dayton Accords. The available NATO air support was not used at the
moment of the attack and was deployed only to a limited extent four days later; the
Dutch peacekeeping force did not resist or deter the Bosnian Serb aggression.
Moreover, over the five days of the genocide no decision was made to step in to contain
the situation.
Beginning in 2004, the topic of Darfur was continually on the agenda of the
Security Council; public opinion in the United States and Europe put pressure on
political leaders to act on the issue, and Security Council members were briefed
monthly by the UN Secretariats in New York and Geneva. No longer was a separation
between peace and security, on the one hand, and protection of human rights, on the
other hand, maintained. The situation was taken very seriously. For instance, at one
point all members of the Security Council gathered in the region for a meeting.
Nonetheless, because of the strong political position of the government of Sudan in the
world and among some members of the Security Council, no action was taken against
Sudan. Until now, all measures with respect to Darfur have been undertaken with the
consent of the Sudanese government.
In retrospect, we can say that in all three cases genocide was not prevented
because, at the appropriate moment, effective measures were not undertaken. For
instance, the situation would have been different if the UN had acted against the
extremist militia in Rwanda in February and March 1994, or against the Bosnian
Serbs in Srebrenica in May and June 1995, by strengthening peacekeeping forces in
manpower and in mandate. The situation in Darfur is different, because no UN
peacekeepers were deployed; however, there was sufficient time to react in Darfur, as
the first full-scale killings did not take place until a year of after the first warnings
were received. Yet, between February 2003 and mid-2005, no real or effective
measures were undertaken to prevent the gross violations of human rights that were
taking place in the region.
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